PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN R V WHITE (LORD HANNINGFIELD) 2016 ALL EQUAL BEFORE THE LAW? by Thomson, Murdoch
131 
The Denning Law Journal 2017 Vol 29 pp 131-139 
 
CASE COMMENTARY 
 
PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN R V WHITE 
(LORD HANNINGFIELD) 2016 
 
ALL EQUAL BEFORE THE LAW? 
 
Murdoch Thomson* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Enshrined within the Bill of Rights of 1689, parliamentary privilege 
continues to act as a guarantor of democracy and parliamentary supremacy, 
by providing a shield from unwarranted interference from the executive, 
the courts and others. Central to the constitutional arrangement of the 
United Kingdom, the functions and works of Parliament is of paramount 
importance. Parliamentarians, including Members of the House of 
Commons and the House of Lords, when conducting public duties must be 
safeguarded to ensure the discharge of such parliamentary business is 
conducted to the highest possible standard without fear or favour but with 
professional integrity. 
 Freedom of speech and exclusive cognisance are referred as the two 
broad categories of privilege1 applicable to parliamentarians, both of which 
promote the freedom of Parliament. As per Sir Edwin Sandys' comments 
prior to the Glorious Revolution of 1688, “Parliament is no parliament if 
not free”2, and article IX of the Bill of Rights 1689, “[that] the freedom of 
speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached 
or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament” 3 , reflects the 
limitations of the Crown and courts to intrude on proceedings. The 1999 
Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege stated that exclusive 
cognisance “is to ensure that Parliament can discharge its functions as a 
                                                 
* LLB (1st Class), Student of LLM in International and Commercial Law at the 
University of Buckingham. 
1 HM Government, Parliamentary Privilege (Cm 8318, 2012) para 17. 
2 Mary Frear Keeler, ‘The Committee for Privileges of the House of Commons 
1604-10 and 1614’ (1994) 32 Parliamentary History 147, 156. 
3 Bill of Rights 1689, s IX. 
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legislative and deliberative assembly without let or hindrance”.4 Privilege 
promotes Parliamentary independence and provides practical measures to 
ensure the smooth continuity of the democratic process. 
 Limited case law5 reflects the successful attempts by both Houses to 
moderate, regulate, and to discipline Members, where malpractice is 
concerned, without the involvement of the courts. The uneasy tension 
concerning privilege rests within the applicability between Members and 
non-members. Where the class of non-members can be subjected to court 
proceedings, orders, and penalties for behaviours and acts, which if 
committed by a Member and claimed under the elusive banner of forming 
parliamentary work could result in an alternative direction of justice. 
 
II. PROCEEDING SUMMARY OF R v WHITE6 
 
 On the 18th of July 2016, sitting in Southwark Crown Court his Honour 
Judge Alistair McCreath [Honorary Recorder of Westminster] directed that 
a not guilty verdict be entered against the indictment upon the Crown 
offering no evidence and inviting such a course. The verdict favoured Lord 
Hanningfield, dismissing allegations of financial misappropriations from 
the Parliamentary Expenses System for illegitimate purposes. 
 It was alleged that Lord Hanningfield made multiple claims for the 
daily allowance of £300, contrary to the qualifying threshold concerning as 
to what constituted parliamentary work, and the location in which the 
parliamentary works occurred. Members of the House of Lords are afforded 
financial support and the 2013 Guide to Financial Support For Members 
states under section 4.1.1 “[that a] member is entitled to claim a daily 
allowance of £300 for each qualifying day of attendance at Westminster”.7 
                                                 
4  Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, Parliamentary Privilege (First 
Report) (1998-99, HL 43-1, HC 214-1) para 241. 
5 C J Builton (ed), Erskine May’s Treaties on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and 
Usage of Parliament (21st edn, Butterworths, 1989) 154 provides a comprehensive 
listing of contemporary cases concerning parliamentary privilege. 
6 R v White (Southwark Crown Court 18th July 2016) 
7 House of Lords ‘Guide to Financial Support for Members’ (Parliament, 2013) 
para 4. Available at <https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-information-
office/2013/Guide-to-Financial-Support-For-Members-2013.pdf> accessed 3 
November 2016. Section 4.1.1 was reaffirmed in the 2016 edition of ‘Guide to 
Financial Support For Members’ (Parliament, 2016) under section 4. Available at 
<http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-finance-office/2016-17/Guide-2016-
17.pdf> accessed 3 November 2016.  
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Lord Hanningield made occasional claims for the daily allowance whilst 
only spending 40 minutes within the Parliamentary Estate.8 
 It is worth noting that Lord Hanningfield was previously convicted 
under section 17 of the Theft Act 19689 for false accounting and imprisoned 
for nine months in 2011.10 Aside from the criminal proceedings, for which 
the defence of privilege was not successfully used, the House Committee 
stipulated additional internal disciplinary measures. Notably a prohibition 
from engaging in divisions, or speaking within the Chamber until April 
2012, when an outstanding sum of £30,000 had been repaid. In October 
2013 Lord Hanningfield return to the House as an unaffiliated life peer, 
after some considerable distancing from the Conservative Party. However, 
in May 2014 Lord Hanningfield was suspended over expenses 
manipulation and was required to repay £3,300 whilst observing a House 
prohibition until May 2015.11 
 The proceedings on the 18th of July, lasting less than five hours, was 
primarily directed by the Crown Prosecution Service, not by McCreath J. 
Resulting from a last minute change of interpretation by the House of Lords 
Authorities, fundamentally addressing the impact a contested jury would 
exert upon parliamentary privileges, the prosecution accepted that with no 
new evidence to challenge the House Authorities, the new interpretation 
                                                 
8 Martin Evans, ‘Expense-Fiddling Peers to be Spared Criminal Trials’ The Daily 
Telegraph (London, 19 July 2016) 2. 
9 Theft Act 1968, s 17:  
17 False accounting. 
(1) Where a person dishonestly, with a view to gain for himself or another or with 
intent to cause loss to another,— 
(a) destroys, defaces, conceals or falsifies any account or any record or 
document made or required for any accounting purpose; or 
(b) in furnishing information for any purpose produces or makes use of any 
account, or any such record or document as aforesaid, which to his knowledge 
is or may be misleading, false or deceptive in a material particular; he shall, on 
conviction on indictment, be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
seven years. 
(2) For purposes of this section a person who makes or concurs in making in an 
account or other document an entry which is or may be misleading, false or 
deceptive in a material particular, or who omits or concurs in omitting a material 
particular from an account or other document, is to be treated as falsifying the 
account or document. 
10 ‘Lord Hanningfield Jailed for Fiddling Expenses’ (BBC News, 1 July 2009) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-13989329> accessed 3 November 2016. 
11 ‘Lord Hanningfield Set To Be Suspended Over Expenses Breach’ (BBC News, 
12 May 2014) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-27373115> accessed 3 
November 2016. 
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would be respected. It is worth noting that as the case primarily concerned 
two central issues, “(a) whether the Defendant was, in fact, undertaking the 
actives12 he claim[ed] to have been undertaking […], and (b) whether the 
Defendant acted honestly […]” 13 , McCreath J earlier ruled for the 
jurisdiction of the courts to apply in proceedings.14 However, and on the 
18th of July, McCreath J did not present a ruling rather observed how the 
new position of the Crown precipitated a not guilty verdict being entered 
against the indictment. 
 
III. EXCLUSIVE COGNISANCE 
 
Often referred to as the doctrine of necessity15, Sir William Blackstone 
described exclusive cognisance as the sole jurisdiction of Parliament when 
“whatever matter arises concerning either house of parliament, ought to be 
examined, discussed, and adjudged in that house to which it relates, and not 
elsewhere”. 16  The doctrine provides immunity from the standard 
application of the law to ensure Parliament conducts its work effectively 
and independently. The privilege of immunity distorts fundamental 
principles of the rule of law, most notably equality before the law, and 
creates an imbalance between the rights for access to justice, and the 
requirement for parliamentary safeguards. Such issues are summarised in 
the 2013-2014 Joint Committee report on Parliamentary Privilege: 
 
A consequence of Parliament’s possession of exclusive cognisance 
over proceedings in Parliament is that participants, both Members 
and non-Members, are not legally liable for things said or done in 
the course of those proceedings; nor are those outside who are 
                                                 
12 Malcolm Jack (ed), Erskine May’s Treaties on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings 
and Usage of Parliament (24th edn, Butterworths, 2011) 203. Notably “an 
exhaustive definition of proceedings in Parliament [can] not be achieved”. 
13 Jeremy Johnson QC, ‘Regina and Lord Hanningfield: Observations on Behalf of 
the House of Lords Authorities’ (July 2016) para 4. 
14 Ibid Johnson (n 13) para 15 “It is [the purpose of] the Courts (not Parliament) to 
determine whether a particular issues comes within the scope of Article 9 of the 
Bill of Rights”. 
15  For the proposes of this case note, a discussion concerning the significant 
historical events facilitating the development of the doctrine has been deliberately 
omitted. For reference, the significant historical events begin with the period of 
parliamentary interference by King Charles I, proceeded by the English Civil War, 
and concludes with the restoration of the Crown in 1660. 
16 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765) 58. 
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adversely affected by things said or done in Parliament able to seek 
redress through the courts.17 
 
The substantive issue concerns the limited jurisdiction of courts to 
moderate the powers of both Parliament and government. Bradlaugh v 
Gossett18  demonstrates the refusal by the court to intervene within the 
internal processes of the House of Commons, when the House incorrectly 
interpreted and applied statute law. To the detriment of Mr Bradlaugh19, it 
was held that Parliament can exercise sole jurisdiction over matters 
pertaining “within the Walls”20 and preclude the courts from interfering, 
irrespective of any rights granted by statute law. To this effect, a House 
may “practically change or practically supersede the law”21 through the 
actions of its Members. However, this paradigm is changing in light of the 
Supreme Court decision in R v Chaytor.22 It would appear that statute law 
and the jurisdiction of the court will be limited only when the “activities in 
question are core to Parliament’s function as a legislative and deliberative 
body”. 23  This assertion signposts the emergence of clarity regarding 
privilege applications and a departure from the uncertainty surrounding the 
extent to which statute law interferes with Parliament. After the decision in 
R v Herbert24 two differing opinions emerged. The first stated that “where 
legislation is silent it is taken as not binding on Parliament”.25 The second 
assumed that “law applies to Parliament, without any need to explicitly 
state that it applies”. 26  It would appear the first opinion has been 
disregarded, as per Lord Phillips in Chaytor; “there appears to have been a 
presumption in Parliament that statute do[es] not apply to activities within 
                                                 
17 Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, Parliamentary Privilege (2013-14, 
HL 30, HC 100) para 17. 
18 [1884] 12 QBD 271. 
19 Ibid (n 18). Mr Charles Bradlaugh, elected Liberal Member for Northampton 
(1880-1891), was prevented from entering Parliament and from taking the Oath of 
Allegiance in accordance with the Parliamentary Oaths Act 1866. The actions of 
the Sergeant at Arms who prevented entry, reflected the religious animosity 
towards atheism. 
20  Charles Gordon (ed), Erskine May’s Treaties on The law, Privileges, 
Proceedings and Usage of Parliament (20th, Butterworths, 1983) 82. 
21 Gossett (n 18). 
22 [2010] UKSC 52. 
23 HM Government (n 1) para 216 [additional emphasis]  
24 The King v Graham-Campbell (ex p Herbert) [1935] 1 KB 594. 
25 HM Government (n 1) para 207. 
26 Ibid HM Government (n 1) para 208. 
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the Palace of Westminster […]. That presumption is open to question”.27 
The second opinion is supported in the test applied by the 1999 Joint 
Committee where exclusive cognisance is available only when “[it] is 
necessary today, in is present form, for the effective functioning of 
Parliament”.28 Additionally, the Supreme Court of Canada held in Canada 
(House of Commons) v Vaid29 that to assert the right of cognisance “the 
assembly must show that the sphere of activity for which privilege is 
claimed is so closely and directly connected with the fulfilment […] of their 
functions […] that outside interference would undermine the level of 
autonomy required”.30 Both cases31 demonstrate that despite the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty and the rights of absolute privilege, the courts 
have formulated a constraint regarding the applicability of exclusive 
cognisance held by each House. Although the principle of judicial 
obedience32 to the will of Parliament is currently maintained, any further 
court implied limitations may seriously damage parliamentary privilege, 
both in practice and as a concept.  
 It is worth noting that Lord Denning MR in British Railways Board v 
Pickin 33  viewed the function of the courts as mutually beneficial to 
Parliament; “It is the function of the courts to see that the procedure of 
Parliament itself is not abused, and that undue advantage is not taken of it. 
In so doing the court is not trespassing on the jurisdiction of Parliament 
itself, it is acting in aid of Parliament and, might I add, in aid of justice”.34 
This view was rejected by the House of Lords35, which stated the function 
of the court was only to consider and apply enactments of Parliament. If 
such a statement made by Lord Denning MR was upheld, it would have 
challenged the independence of Parliament, and eroded the fundamental 
articles contained within the Bill of Rights 1689. 
 Despite the limitations implied through the courts, other methods of 
curtailing privilege can be conducted with the consent of either House in 
                                                 
27 Chaytor (n 22) para 78. 
28 Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege (n 4) para 4. 
29 [2005] 1 SCR 667 
30 Ibid Vaid (n 29) para 4. 
31  Despite Vaid originating from the Canadian Supreme Court the British 
Parliament has endorsed the substantive test. See Joint Committee on 
Parliamentary Privilege (n 17) para 24. 
32 Diana Woodhouse, ‘Politicians and the Judges: A Conflict of Interest’ (1996) 49 
Parliamentary Affairs 423.  
33 [1973] 1 QB 219. 
34 Ibid Pickin (n 33). 
35 [1974] WLR 208 (on appeal to the House of Lords). 
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Parliament. As held in Stockdale v Hansard36, each House is the principal 
judge of its privileges. Each House may, as its own discretion, formulate 
legislation to limit the applicable nature of Parliamentary Privilege. 
However, both Houses cannot create new privileges. The Recall of MPs 
Act 2015 provides for the automatic disqualification from the House of 
Commons if a Member is “…convicted in the United Kingdom for an 
offence and sentenced”37, for a period greater than 12 months. For the 
purposes of the Act, Parliament cannot be viewed to provide sanctuary from 
the law “where the conduct of a MP does not relate to proceedings in 
Parliament”.38 Whilst the Act provides a limitation of privilege to Members 
of the House of Commons, the House of Lords Reform Act 201439 provides 
a similar mechanisms for exclusion and expulsion40 for Peers. As with all 
articles of legislation, successor Parliaments may elect to repeal the 
aforementioned Acts and reduce the constraints limiting privilege 
interpretation and application. The doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty 
would suggest that privilege is an inherent right of Westminster, originating 
from the conception of the British Parliamentary model. 
 
IV. REFORM 
 
 The delicate balance between Parliamentary rights and the rule of law 
has long been an issue discussed within the Palace of Westminster, the 
courts, and the public realm. The substantive cause for debate centralises 
over the extent to which the various forms of privilege can be used; the 
                                                 
36 [1839] 112 ER 1112. 
37 Recall of MPs Act 2015 s 1(3)(a). 
38 HM Government (n 1) para 27. 
39 Dan Byles, former Conservative Member of Parliament for North Warwickshire 
(2010-2015), proposed the various reforms in a Private Members Bill in May 2014. 
As of May 2016, only four Peers have been removed under the Act entirely for 
non-attendance (House of Lords Reform Act 2014, s 2) during proceedings. ‘Four 
Absent Peers Cease to be House of Lords Members’ (BBC News, 19 May 2016) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36330030> accessed 3 November 2016. 
40 House of Lords Reform Act 2014, s 3: 
(1) A member of the House of Lords who is convicted of a serious offence ceases 
to be a member of the House of Lords. 
(2) A person “is convicted of a serious offence” if, and only if, the Lord Speaker 
certifies the person, while a member of the House of Lords, has been— 
(a) convicted of a criminal offence, and 
(b) sentenced or ordered to be imprisoned or detained indefinitely or for 
more than one year. 
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limited jurisdiction of the courts; and the inherent inequality between those 
who enjoy privileges and those who do not. 
 The Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privileges has taken a proactive 
stance by conducting periodical reviews of privileges. The reports to both 
Houses identifies the relevance of freedom of speech and exclusive 
cognisance. The Committee strongly dispels any doubt that privileges are 
unwarranted, rather it reaffirms the necessity in relation to the effective 
discharge of duties required by both Houses. The 1999 Report suggested 
comprehensive codification41 with a view of providing greater clarity by 
codifying all aspects of parliamentary privileges. The proposed 
Parliamentary Privileges Act aimed to define, amongst other issues, 
proceedings in Parliament, Parliamentary competence, and to outline the 
extent to which privileges could be claimed. The major disadvantage of 
codification is a reduction in flexibility. Cited in the 2013-2014 Report, 
“[…] privilege is a living concept […] and evolves as Parliament evolves, 
and as the law evolves”.42 By codifying privileges, Parliament would bind 
itself to what would quickly become an obsolete interpretation, reflecting 
outdated opinions and perspectives. 
 In a Green Paper published in 2012, the Government summarised a 
critical issue, “Parliamentary privilege is not a widely understood 
concept”.43 The Paper indicates that special consideration must be afforded 
towards any motion for reform, and reform ought not be initiated without 
comprehensive political support. Stating that privilege “has developed over 
many centuries”44, it was the opinion of the Government that no legislation 
should be introduced. Indeed, the coalition Government between the 
Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats did not seek reform. It 
remains to be seen if the current Conservative Government will introduce 
legislation to clarify the applicable nature of exclusive cognisance. Given 
the heavy legislative programme, with particular regards towards the 
forthcoming European Union departure, reform appears unlikely.  
 In 2014 the Joint Committee concluded that an exhaustive list relating 
to matters subject to exclusive cognisance is “impracticable and 
undesirable”.45 The fundamental element of Parliamentary privilege is to 
be detached from court interference. By codifying privileges the court 
would assert an active role regarding interpretation and application. This 
would be unacceptable as Parliamentary freedom would be restricted. The 
                                                 
41 Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege (n 4) para 378. 
42 Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege (n 17) para 13. 
43 HM Government (n 1) para 343. 
44 Ibid HM Government (n 1) para 343-35. 
45 Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege (n 17) 71. 
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Committee has made a series of recommendations46 that indicate temporal 
inappropriateness for serious and substantive reform. This is disappointing 
as the situation continues to be exacerbated by a general lack of consensus 
concerning the correct application of privileges. The actions of Members, 
reaching beyond the after effects of the 2011 Parliamentary Expenses 
Scandal, continue to cast doubt within the public realm regarding the 
appropriateness of implied immunities from the law. 
 During the proceedings against Lord Hanningfield, the expedited return 
of a not-guilty verdict precluded a formal examination of the alleged 
conduct by the Member in open court. A jury was not invited to consider 
the evidence presented by the Crown, nor did the court explore the evidence 
collected by the Metropolitan Police Service and other government 
agencies. From the application of parliamentary privilege, the trial of Lord 
Hanningfield is blatantly different from what would be expected in similar 
civil or criminal cases concerning financial malpractice. Submissions 
during proceedings exclusively concerned if exclusive cognisance was 
applicable; such debate would unavailable for individuals not pertaining to 
the class of Parliamentarians. Aside from the trial-by-media that Lord 
Hanningfield experienced, no substantive penalty has been imposed and to 
date, no further public investigation has occurred. From R v White47 it is 
debatable if an application of parliamentary privilege is appropriate 
regarding financial allegations and the need to encourage transparency of 
both Parliament and Parliamentarians. Therefore, in situations where public 
finances are concerned, it could be appropriate for the defences of privilege 
not to apply. The inherent value of privileges distorting the commonly held 
maxim of equality would appear as disproportionate in regards to repetitive 
malpractice and subsequent allegations. 
 Parliament, Government, and the courts are not directly seeking 
substantial and immediate reform. It is clear that differing attitudes 
continue to develop as parliamentary privileges continues to evolve. These 
attitudes acknowledge the tension between jurisdictional limitations, 
historical precedents and doctrines, and the distorting effect immunities 
bears on the rule of law. Whilst Parliament and Government wish to 
maintain their privileges, and the courts wishing for greater regulation, 
perhaps the status quo ought to remain. Perhaps the debate to have or not 
to have privilege is inherent within our system of governance. Perhaps an 
evolutionarily path of development, driven by Parliament, supported by 
Government, and questioned by the courts, is the future of parliamentary 
privileges. 
                                                 
46 Ibid (n 17) for a definitive list of recommendations proposed by the Joint 
Committee. 
47 White (n 6). 
